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Abstract 
Parenthood contributes substantially to broader gender wage inequality. The intensification of 
gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work after the birth of a child create unequal 
constraints and expectations such that, all else equal, mothers earn less than childless women, 
but fathers earn a wage premium. The fatherhood wage premium, however, varies 
substantially among men. Analyses of linked workplace-employee data from Canada reveal 
how organizational context conditions educational, occupational, and family-status variation 
in fatherhood premiums. More formal employment relations (collective bargaining and 
human resource departments) reduce both overall fatherhood premiums and group differences 
in them, while performance pay systems (merit and incentive pay) have mixed effects. 
Shifting entrenched gendered divisions of household labour is thus not the only pathway to 
minimizing fathers’ wage advantage. 
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Workplace Variation in Fatherhood Wage Premiums:  
Do Formalization and Performance Pay Matter? 
 
In many countries, parenthood has a disparate impact on women’s and men’s wages. Mothers 
typically incur wage penalties vis-à-vis otherwise similar childless women, but fathers can 
receive a net wage premium (Cooke, 2014; Fuller, 2017; Killewald, 2013; Waite and Denier, 
2015). Parenting pay gaps thus contribute substantially to broader gender wage inequalities. 
Fathers’ wage premiums, however, vary among men. Married (Hodges and Budig, 2010; 
Killewald, 2013), white (Glauber, 2008; Hodges and Budig, 2010), highly educated, 
professional (Hodges and Budig, 2010), and heterosexual (Waite and Denier, 2015) fathers 
garner larger premiums.  
What drives such variation? Although individual and household characteristics can 
contribute via their impact on productivity and effort, sociologists also recognize that 
workplaces are critical for the generation of inequality (Baron and Bielby, 1980; Nelson and 
Bridges, 1999; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). In North America, workplaces are 
particularly important insofar as wage and promotion decisions are typically made at this 
level (Bidwell et al., 2013). In seeking to understand variation in US fatherhood premiums, 
Hodges and Budig (2010) thus highlight the importance of organizations. Men who more 
closely approximate the hegemonic ideal of heterosexuality, whiteness, rational authority, 
and technical competence are seen as legitimating the broader power hierarchies of 
bureaucratic organizations, potentially accruing larger premiums as a result. 
Yet although their argument focuses on organizational dynamics, Hodges and Budig 
rely on individual-level data. As a result, their analysis has two important limitations. First, it 
cannot isolate the wage inequalities within establishments that are central to their argument 
from any accruing by virtue of how fathers and childless men are sorted across high and low-
wage firms. Research disentangling the establishment component of fatherhood wage 
premiums is limited. Looking at white-collar workers in Norway, Petersen et al. (2011; 2014) 
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find that none of the small Norwegian fatherhood premium derives from establishment 
choice, but the occupational variation in net fatherhood premiums found by Hodges and 
Budig (2010) raises the question of whether effects are the same for other occupations. 
Indeed, Cooke and Fuller (forthcoming) find that less occupationally advantaged Canadian 
fathers sort into higher waged establishments, contributing to their wage premium.   
A second limitation of both Hodges and Budig and the aforementioned studies is the 
failure to consider how variation in workplace characteristics might condition differences in 
fathers’ wage advantage. Recent scholarship makes clear that dynamics specific to individual 
workplaces (including power relations, patterns of segregation, and formal and informal rules 
around hiring, downsizing, assessment, and valuation) shape group wage inequalities (Avent-
Holt and Tomaksovic-Devey, 2010, 2014; Baron et al., 2007; Kalev, 2014). In other words, 
fatherhood premiums are unlikely to reflect a singular bureaucratic logic as suggested by 
Hodges and Budig, but rather should vary for differently structured workplaces.  
The analyses herein overcome these limitations by drawing on linked employer-
employee data from the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES), facilitating a 
more direct test of Hodges and Budig’s claims about hierarchies, organizational logics, and 
premium patterns. In addition, the WES is broadly representative and contains detailed 
information on workplace characteristics. This allows for consideration of how two key 
structural characteristics, formalization and compensation practices, shape the impact of 
individual-level characteristics often used to predict wages. 
 
EXPLAINING FATHERS’ NET WAGE PREMIUM 
Echoing broader scholarship on wage inequality, researchers employing individual-level data 
typically focus on three potential explanations for the 3-10% net fatherhood wage premium in 
North America (Glauber, 2008; Hodges and Budig, 2010; Killewald, 2013; Waite and Denier, 
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2015). The article proceeds by outlining these mechanisms, then contextualizing them in light 
of organizational structures and processes that potentially moderate their impact. 
 Explanations that focus on human capital suggest that fathers are simply better workers 
(Becker, 1981). First, fathers’ wage advantage may reflect differences in underlying but 
unmeasured characteristics (such as dependability or sociability) that make men more 
desirable to both would-be mothers and employers (Petersen et al, 2011). Smith Koslowski 
(2011) finds such positive selection in a few European countries, but not in the majority. 
Petersen et al. (2011, p.297) find positive selection for Norwegian fathers in their within-
establishment estimates, but it is minor. Evidence from the US is mixed (Hodges and Budig, 
2010; Loughran and Zissimopoulos, 2009; Lundberg and Rose, 2000). Regardless, 
accounting for stable unobserved characteristics with longitudinal data and person fixed 
effects models does not necessarily eliminate differences in the premium among groups 
(Glauber, 2008; Hodges and Budig, 2010).  
   A second productivity explanation for the wage premium is that fatherhood motivates 
men to work harder (Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Percheski and Wildeman, 2008), especially 
when mothers prioritize domestic work over employment (Becker, 1981). Differences in 
men’s earning capacity and partners’ employment patterns may in turn impact the degree to 
which fatherhood is motivating. It is difficult to objectively measure work intensity and 
effort, but fathers and childless men do not self-report differences in either (Kmec, 2011). 
Some men do increase their employment hours following a birth, but other men who do not 
can still receive net hourly wage premiums (Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Smith Koslowski, 
2011). Furthermore, work hours do not account for group differences in the net wage 
premium (Glauber, 2008; Hodges and Budig, 2010). The evidence is mixed as to whether 
mothers’ employment affects the fatherhood premium (Killewald, 2013; Lundberg and Rose, 
2000), but group differences in household divisions of paid labour do not account for group 
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differences in net fatherhood wage premiums (Glauber, 2008; Hodges and Budig, 2010). 
Spending greater time in childcare (Smith Koslowski, 2011) and housework (Killewald and 
Garcia-Manglano, 2016) does not diminish fathers’ wage advantage over childless men. In 
all, men’s individual and household characteristics do not fully account for the fatherhood 
wage premium.  
A third explanation for the fatherhood premium focuses not on fathers’ individual 
characteristics, but on employer biases that lead them to favour fathers over childless men 
and some groups of fathers over others. Widely held cultural beliefs about fathers as 
motivated breadwinners may encourage employers to view fathers as particularly hard-
working, dependable, and loyal workers. Correspondence studies have not tended to find 
evidence of hiring discrimination in favour of fathers (Bygren et al., 2017; Correll et al., 
2007), but employers may still favour fathers when setting wages or considering promotions.  
But why would positive stereotypes operate more powerfully for some fathers than 
others? In recent years, scholars working under the umbrella of “relational inequality theory” 
have placed renewed attention on how organizational contexts shape patterns of inequality. 
One strand of this research takes a conflict perspective, assuming that inequalities result from 
dominant groups’ active hoarding of opportunities and exploitation of subordinate groups 
(Tilly, 1998; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2009; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). Groups that 
are advantaged in organizational hierarchies leverage this to reproduce inequalities favouring 
them.  
Unlike other commonly studied categorical distinctions (gender, race), fatherhood is 
always an achieved status. All fathers were once childless, and childless men may anticipate 
fatherhood in the future. Conscious pursuit of group-based privilege may therefore be less 
salient than for ascribed categorical statuses. However, Hodges and Budig (2010) argue that 
distinctions based on fatherhood are intimately tied to the legitimation of broader gender 
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inequalities in workplaces. Linking Connell’s (1987) concept of hegemonic masculinities 
with Acker’s (1990) critique of the androcentric foundations of organizations, they contend 
that fatherhood wage premiums accrue within workplaces in tandem with gendered systems 
of organizational power. In bureaucratic organizations, the “ideal worker” privileges 
organizational demands, devoting time and attention to the job above all else (Acker, 1990; 
Williams, 2000). This ideal is presumptively masculine. Women’s disproportionate 
responsibility for unpaid housework and caregiving supports men’s ability to devote 
themselves fully to their job while making it more difficult for women to live up to this ideal. 
Thus, the traditional household model of a male-breadwinner/female caregiver sustains men’s 
economic dominance over women and aligns with the organizational ideal of a job-focused, 
disembodied worker (Connell, 1987; Ridgeway and Correll, 2004).  
Of course, not all fathers’ family arrangements fit the traditional model. In Canada, 
the majority (52%) of couple families with children have two full-time working parents, with 
less than one third comprised of a single breadwinner (Statistics Canada, 2016). Hodges and 
Budig (2010) argue that organizations will more greatly reward the latter group of fathers 
because their domestic arrangements more closely align with ideal worker norms. As a result, 
Hodges and Budig anticipated the net fatherhood wage premium would be larger for married 
fathers, and among married fathers, larger for those who are the primary family earner. 
 An intersecting strand of organizational research emphasizes the role of implicit 
biases in perpetuating and legitimizing inequalities (Castilla, 2010; Reskin, 2000; Stainback 
et al., 2010). Implicit biases intensify when status distinctions (such as fatherhood) map 
closely with organizational hierarchies (Ridgeway 2014; Tilly 1998). Hodges and Budig 
(2010) thus also argue that organizations will grant larger rewards to fathers displaying the 
technical competence associated with higher education and rational authority associated with 
professional or managerial occupations. In all, organizational logics are presumed to 
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reinforce men’s dominance over women, as well as class and family status hierarchies among 
men.  
 However, Hodges and Budig (2010: 735) find only partial empirical support for their 
arguments. Net of controls, family breadwinner status only magnifies the premium for 
Latinos (14% in dual-earner marriages versus 29.7% for breadwinners). White and Latino 
fathers’ net premium does increase with education (e.g. 8.3% for Whites with high school or 
below, 9.4% with some college and 21% with at least a Bachelor’s), but African-Americans’ 
does not. Only white fathers’ premium varies with occupation (7.6% for nonprofessional 
fathers and 11.6% for professionals and managers). Absent from their conceptualization and 
empirical tests, though, is how diversity in local arrangements might condition group wage 
inequalities across firms.  
WORKPLACE VARIATION IN FATHERHOOD WAGE PREMIUMS  
Whether driven by actors’ strategic action or implicit bias, favouritism within organizations 
may occur  in various ways. Supervisors may view fathers’ performance more positively, be 
more receptive to their requests for raises or think of them first when considering training 
opportunities and promotions. At the same time, workplace characteristics may temper or 
reinforce fathers who act to further their advantage by shaping both the scope for strategic 
action and the degree to which biases are activated and consequential (Castilla and Benard, 
2010; Elvira and Graham, 2000; Reskin, 2000). In this respect, workplace features that 
structure decisions around wages and promotions, such as formalization and compensation 
systems, are potentially salient. 
Formalized systems 
Bureaucratic rules that are neutral in the face of entrenched inequality can magnify group 
differences in access to opportunities, positions, and their rewards (Baron et al, 2007; Kalev 
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2014; Tilly, 1998). At the same time, written rules and procedures reduce supervisors’ 
latitude to indulge their biases when making decisions (Anderson and Tomaskovic-Devey, 
1995; Baron et al., 2007; Elvira and Graham, 2002). Although results are not entirely 
consistent, numerous studies find that formalization reduces gender, immigration, racial, and 
motherhood wage gaps (e.g. Fuller, 2017; Elvira and Zatzick, 2002; Reskin and McBrier, 
2000; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). Formalized personnel arrangements may minimize 
the net fatherhood wage premium as well if it reflects biased decision-making. 
Collective bargaining agreements are among the strictest formal systems, with job 
rates rather than personal rates largely determining pay (Card et al., 2003; Freeman, 1980; 
Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2009). Collective bargaining agreements reduce gender wage gaps 
within firms (Heinze and Wolf, 2008), and wage gaps between mothers and childless women 
(Fuller, 2017). Unionization should reduce fatherhood wage premiums by minimizing the 
potential for favouring fathers over childless men in the same job, or breadwinning over dual-
earning fathers. Unionization also minimizes class disparities. Freeman’s (1980) seminal 
research highlights that unionization simultaneously raises the wage floor and blunts returns 
paid to high-skilled workers. A more equitable wage distribution likely reduces scope for 
differences in fatherhood premiums between more and less advantaged workers as well. This 
implies: 
 
H1: collective bargaining agreements will minimize the net fatherhood wage premium 
and breadwinning, educational, and occupational differences in it.    
 
Human resources (HR) departments also impose formal personnel policies that could 
reduce supervisors’ ability to indulge personal biases (Baron et al., 2007; Dobbin, 2009). It is 
illegal in all Canadian provinces save New Brunswick to make employment decisions on the 
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basis of family status.
1
 Ensuring that employment decisions do not violate legal requirements 
is part of HR’s remit (Kalev, 2014; Dobbin, 2009), and their involvement in establishing and 
monitoring promotion processes should reduce the chance that managers will use fatherhood 
as a decision criterion. Moreover, by creating more standardized procedures with explicit 
criteria, HR professionals should also reduce the scope for implicit biases to influence 
decisions. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
H2a: The presence of an HR department will minimize net wage disparities directly 
associated with men’s family status, both the net fatherhood wage premium and 
breadwinning fathers’ additional premium.  
 
Unlike collective bargaining agreements, HR procedures replicate the organizational 
bureaucracies that may reinforce skill inequalities (Acker, 1990, 2006). For example, the 
presence of an HR department magnifies educational advantage (Avent-Holt and 
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2010). This implies: 
 
H2b: The presence of an HR department will not diminish occupational or 
educational differences in net fatherhood wage premiums. 
Compensation schemes 
In recent years, North American employers have been expanding performance-based pay 
schemes such as bonuses, commissions, piece rates, and merit-based pay (Bidwell et al., 
2013; Elvira and Graham, 2002; Lemieux et al., 2009). In theory, such schemes tether wages 
more closely to performance (Fang and Heywood, 2009). As such, they enhance 
opportunities for fathers to earn higher wages via greater effort and productivity, while also 
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potentially muting employer discrimination. However, as outlined below, some presumably 
“objective” performance-based systems may favour some fathers over others. 
Incentive pay:  Incentive pay includes bonuses, piece-rates, and commissions that 
reward individuals based on individual output or performance. In the only study to consider 
incentive pay and parenting wage gaps, Heywood and Parent (2017) find that American 
fathers’ wage premium is largely limited to jobs with incentive pay. Lemieux et al. (2009) 
reveal that productivity-related characteristics better predict wages in jobs that include such 
incentives than in those where they are absent. This suggests that incentive pay does 
strengthen the link between productivity and rewards. Further supporting this notion is the 
research finding that piece rates and commissions reduce or eliminate racial pay gaps among 
North American men that are apparent in time-based pay systems (Fang and Heywood, 2009; 
Heywood and O’Halloran, 2005). This implies that incentive pay should advantage fathers 
within workplaces if they really are more productive.  
 
H3a: Fathers working under incentive schemes will have a larger net premium.  
 
The motivation to maximize rewards under such schemes should be greater for 
breadwinning fathers, as they have the added pressure of being the primary household 
provider: 
 
H3b: Breadwinning fathers will have a larger advantage vis-à-vis childless men when 
working under incentive schemes than will dual-earner fathers.  
  
 The impact of incentive schemes on class differences in the net fatherhood wage 
premium is less clear. Because their overall household earnings are lower, less-educated or 
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working-class fathers might be especially motivated to increase their effort under incentive 
schemes, suggesting: 
 
H3c: Less-educated and non-managerial/non-professional fathers will garner higher 
fatherhood premiums under incentive schemes. 
 
At the same time, Lemieux et al. (2009) find that returns to education are larger in incentive 
schemes than fixed-wage contracts. Heywood and Parent (2017) also find that the increase in 
the net wage gap between fathers and childless men with incentive pay is much stronger at 
the higher end of the earnings distribution. This suggests the competing hypothesis that 
opportunities to maximize earnings with incentives are greater for fathers that are more 
educated: 
 
H3d: Fathers that are more educated will garner larger wage premiums within 
incentive pay schemes than less-educated fathers.  
 
The above hypotheses relate to actual performance differences, which should be 
relatively clear where incentives consist of commissions and piece-rates. Even so, differences 
in assignments and judgements about whether quality standards have been met create some 
room for discretion and non-performance based inequalities (Fang and Heywood, 2006; 
Madden, 2012), as can customer discrimination in service jobs (Madden and Vekker, 2017). 
Bonus-pay, classed in the WES as an incentive, also tends to be discretionary (Elvira and 
Graham, 2002). Indeed, research on the role of incentive pay in moderating gender wage gaps 
has generated mixed results (e.g. Jirjahn and Stephan, 2004; Madden 2012; Kangasniemi and 
Kauhanen, 2013).  
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Merit-based pay:   
When performance pay is based on supervisor determinations of merit rather than 
clear outputs, there is even greater room for wage gaps to widen in favour of advantaged 
groups. Although the formalization of performance appraisals that typically accompany merit 
awards may mitigate bias (Elvira and Graham, 2002), a sizeable literature confirms 
performance evaluation bias on both subjective and more objective measures (Roth et al., 
2003). The general pattern is that, ceteris paribus, high-status groups receive higher 
performance evaluations (DiTomaso et al., 2007; Kraiger, 1985; Reskin and McBrier, 2000). 
Castilla (2008) points out that even if performance appraisal bias can be mitigated, 
bias can occur at the more discretionary wage allocation stage. He finds that women and 
minorities in a large US service organization receive less compensation than white men when 
they have equal performance scores. In a subsequent experimental study, Castilla and Benard 
(2010) reveal a “paradox of meritocracy.”  Test subjects award women much smaller raises 
than identical men when an organization is explicitly presented as meritocratic. The authors 
conclude that the cloak of meritocracy triggers raters’ acceptance of their implicit biases and 
stereotypes as legitimate performance differences.  
The process of merit-based pay awards reflects the combination of organizational 
logics and supervisor behaviour that Hodges and Budig (2010) argue result in group 
differences in net fatherhood wage premiums. Consistent with this as well, performance pay 
magnifies racial and gender earnings gaps most strongly at the top of the earnings distribution 
(Fabling et al., 2012; Heywood and Parent, 2012). From this we derive our final hypothesis: 
 
H4: Merit-based schemes will increase the net fatherhood wage premium and 
breadwinning, educational, and occupational differences in it.  
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METHOD 
Data and sample 
Canada’s Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) is a mandatory survey fielded from 1999 
to 2005, with response rates in excess of 80 percent for both workplaces and employees. 
Workplaces were sampled from all those in Canadian provinces with paid employees, 
excluding public administration, private households, religious organizations, and fishing and 
trapping industries. The WES definition of workplace is synonymous with establishment: 
“the smallest organizational unit, comprised of at least one physical location that can provide 
a complete set of input and output statistics.”  The workplace sample was refreshed every 
second year to maintain representativeness.  
In each odd year (1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005), a new random sample of up to 24 
employees was drawn from each workplace and followed the next year. Unfortunately, this 
time frame is too short to allow estimation of individual-level fixed effects. Analyses were 
restricted to odd-numbered years to ensure employee outcomes are tied to the characteristics 
of the workplaces where they were employed when responding, with data pooled across 
waves to maximize sample size.  
Analyses were limited to white men as Canada’s racial landscape is complex and merits 
a separate analysis. The sample was restricted to those who are at least 24 years of age 
because the WES does not measure school enrolment. Men 45 and older were excluded 
because the WES asks only whether fathers are currently living with children, not whether 
they ever had children. These restrictions yield an analytical sample of 18,730 men embedded 
in 5,715 establishment-years, and 5,020 unique workplaces. For analysis of breadwinner 
effects, the sample was restricted to partnered men (n= 13,960).  
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Individual-level variables  
The dependent variable was the natural log of hourly wages. This measure was calculated 
using base earnings as well as bonuses, profit sharing, overtime premiums, tips, etc., divided 
by men’s usual paid hours (including usual overtime hours).   
The key independent variable was whether a man is a father, indicated by living with at 
least one child under 19. Other key individual-level independent variables relate to education, 
occupation, and breadwinner status. Education was indicated with four dummy variables (less 
than high school, high school diploma, non-university postsecondary certificate, and 
university degree or higher). Another variable distinguished men who work in professional or 
managerial occupations versus all others. We designate a partnered man a “breadwinner” 
when he earned 80 percent or more of the total household earnings. Smaller or greater 
thresholds (60%, 70%, 90%) had small impacts on the magnitude of effects (which generally 
increased with a higher threshold), but did not substantively change results.  
All models controlled for partnership status (single, cohabiting, married), human capital 
(actual years of full-time experience and its square, an interaction between experience and 
education), labour supply (working less than 35 hours per week, 35-49, or 50 or more), tenure 
with the employer and its square, and survey year (to account for business cycle).  
Workplace characteristics   
Employer representatives reported establishment-level characteristics except coverage under 
a collective bargaining agreement, which the employee reported. To assess the impact of 
formalization, we included both collective bargaining agreement, and presence of an HR 
department.  
For compensation schemes, one dummy variable indicated workplaces with individual 
incentive systems such as bonuses, piece rates, and commissions that reward individuals 
based on individual output or performance. A second indicated those with merit pay, defined 
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as, “skill-based pay that is a reward or honour given for superior qualities, great abilities or 
expertness that comes from training, practice, etc.” Both measures were reported for different 
occupational groups within the establishment and indexed to the occupation to which the 
individual belonged.  
Analytical strategy 
The theoretical dynamics of interest affect wage and promotion decisions for existing 
employees. They are therefore best assessed for fatherhood wage gaps within establishments. 
The conventional way to estimate this is to include establishment fixed effects, thus 
controlling for characteristics that similarly impact wages for all individuals in a given 
establishment. However, the relatively small number of men in our sample within each 
establishment (mean = 3.4) makes estimating establishment fixed effects with the limited 
sample potentially problematic. To provide more robust estimates, we used the entire WES 
sample (N=85,320 individuals, mean = 17 observations per establishment, max = 79) to 
calculate the establishment fixed effects via a two-step strategy (Canay, 2011; Javdani, 2015).  
The first step entailed regressing log-hourly wages on the individual control variables 
for the full WES sample, adding further controls for gender, race-ethnicity, and each 
establishment: 
𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽 +𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑍 + 𝑓ijψ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                (1) 
 
In equation 1, 𝑓ij is a vector of indicators for each firm and ψ is a vector of establishment 
effects measuring establishment-specific average wages conditional on worker 
characteristics. The establishment effects were saved and subtracted from each individual’s 
log-hourly wage to create a new, transformed dependent variable, 𝐹𝐸𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗.  
𝐹𝐸𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 is each individual’s log-hourly wages purged of the impact of workplace-
constant characteristics. This transformed dependent variable was then used in the second 
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step to estimate the average deviation of fathers’ wages from those of childless men within 
particular workplaces for the sample of white Canadian men: 
 
𝐹𝐸𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝜒𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑓𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    (2) 
 
As long as fixed effects are the same within a given establishment for the reduced and 
the full sample, the two-step approach removes the fixed effects and gives consistent 
estimates of slope parameters. This assumption is reasonable for establishment effects in the 
WES, as the correlation between establishment wage effects calculated with the reduced and 
full WES sample was .91.
2
   
Testing the impact of establishment characteristics  
Three-way interactions between fatherhood, group (education, occupation, and 
breadwinning), and establishment characteristics revealed how workplace contexts affected 
variation in the net fatherhood wage premium. No cell size for the interactions was smaller 
than 200. For ease of reporting, separate models estimated the aggregate fatherhood wage 
premium and each focal two- and three-way interaction. A model including all interactions 
simultaneously yielded very similar average predicted effects. Employee sample weights 
were used in all analyses, with standard errors estimated using bootstrap weights provided by 
Statistics Canada.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics reveal that fathers and childless men are similar on all characteristics 
except partnership status and (age-related) experience and seniority (available online in 
Appendix Table O-1). Predicted (average marginal) effects of fatherhood’s impact on wages 
net of establishment fixed effects are presented in Appendix Table A-1. For easier display 
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vis-à-vis our hypotheses, we graph predicted effects from the two- and three-way 
interactions. Diagrammed educational contrasts are limited to men with the least and most 
education to simplify presentation.  
[Figure 1] 
Figure 1 displays the predicted 4.6% (e
(0.045)
 - 1) x 100) fatherhood wage premium net 
of individual characteristics and establishment fixed effects. Figure 1 also displays how the 
net fatherhood wage premium varied by the focal group characteristics. Fathers in 
professional or managerial occupations enjoyed the largest net wage premium of 6.9%, 
significantly more than the 3.6% net premium for fathers in other occupations. The next 
largest net premium was 6.3% for breadwinning fathers, as compared with 2.6% among dual-
earning fathers. Fathers with a university degree received a 5.3% premium, as compared with 
1.8% for fathers with less than a high school diploma. The premium for the least-educated 
fathers was still statistically significant but the smallest of all groups. Overall, the group 
differences in within-establishment net fatherhood wage premiums among white Canadian 
men more strongly support Hodges and Budig’s argument than did their economy-wide US 
estimates.  
[Figure 2] 
 Figure 2 diagrams how the average net fatherhood premium varied with each 
workplace characteristic. Hypothesis 1 that collective bargaining agreements reduce the 
aggregate fatherhood premium was strongly supported. The predicted net wage premium for 
fathers not covered by a collective bargaining agreement was almost five times larger than for 
fathers in unionized settings, 6.0% as compared with 1.3%. Hypothesis 2a that an HR 
department would also reduce the net wage premium was also supported, although the 
difference in premiums in workplaces with and without an HR department was much smaller 
than for collective bargaining agreements. 
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 In contrast, none of the compensation scheme hypotheses regarding the average net 
fatherhood wage premium were supported. Although the average premium was larger under 
incentive pay schemes (H3a), the difference was not significant. Merit pay schemes predicted 
a significantly smaller net fatherhood wage premium of 3.2% as compared with 5.2% without 
them. This contradicts the fourth hypothesis that merit-based schemes increase group wage 
inequalities.  
[Figure 3] 
 Do the workplace characteristics affect the breadwinning, educational, and 
occupational differences in net fatherhood wage premiums?  As evident in the top panel of 
Figure 3, collective bargaining entirely eliminated the 5-7% net wage premiums associated 
with a university degree, professional occupation, and male breadwinning as anticipated 
(H1). Collective bargaining agreements also reduced the smaller “other” occupation and dual-
earning fatherhood premiums, but to a lesser degree. Note that the least-educated white 
fathers actually fared worse than their childless counterparts under such agreements, 
incurring a 2% wage penalty.  
 The impact of HR departments on group differences is diagrammed in the bottom 
panel of Figure 3. As hypothesized given legislation on family status (H2a), HR departments 
reduced breadwinning fathers’ additional wage premium to just 1.8%. They had no impact on 
dual-earning fathers’ net premium. As a result, the fatherhood wage premium in workplaces 
with formal HR departments was larger among dual-earning than breadwinning fathers. HR 
departments did not diminish university-educated or professional fathers’ additional net wage 
premiums. While this supports the verbiage of Hypothesis 2b, HR departments in fact 
magnified class differentials insofar as they were associated with smaller premiums for the 
least-educated fathers and those in non-professional occupations. 
 [Figure 4] 
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Figure 4 depicts the impact of compensation schemes. Recall that aggregate 
differences in the premium were minimal under incentive pay. Figure 4 reveals that 
breadwinning fathers earned appreciably more under incentive schemes than on other pay 
systems (top panel). Yet dual-earning fathers also enjoyed a larger net premium with 
incentive pay, such that the difference between the two groups was sustained. This is contrary 
to H3b, which predicted incentive pay would increase breadwinning fathers’ advantage over 
dual-earners.  
 Somewhat surprisingly, competing hypotheses H3c and H3d both receive support. 
Both the least- and highest-educated fathers earned a larger hourly wage premium under 
incentive schemes, 10.4% and 13.3%, respectively. Not shown are the effects among fathers 
with moderate education, for whom incentive pay predicted somewhat smaller wage 
premiums. Thus while there is little support for hypothesis 3c or 3d when contrasting the 
least- and most-educated fathers, perhaps the underlying dynamics (greater motivation of 
least-skilled fathers to expend more effort per H3c, and greater opportunity for highest-
skilled fathers to benefit from enhanced productivity per H3d) produce benefits at the 
extremes relative to fathers with moderate qualifications.  
These possible mechanisms, however, did not translate to occupational differences 
(H3c). Neither professional fathers nor those in other occupations earned appreciably more 
under incentive pay schemes than fathers did in fixed-pay plans. In all, results provided weak 
support for the third set of hypotheses. The neutral impact of incentive pay schemes on the 
aggregate fatherhood premium reflects substantial variability in effects across groups.   
The bottom panel of Figure 4 diagrams effects of merit-based pay. Building on 
Castilla’s (2008) research, H4 anticipated merit-based pay would increase fatherhood 
premiums and exacerbate breadwinning, educational, and occupational differences in them. 
However, merit-based pay reduced the net fatherhood premium for most groups, although 
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half of the differences were not statistically significant. The only instance where merit-based 
pay magnified group inequalities was when comparing the least educated fathers to the most: 
the advantage of the latter group was greater under merit pay schemes. However, this was not 
because merit schemes increased the most educated fathers’ advantage. Instead, merit pay 
predicted a significant wage penalty for the least-educated fathers. Overall, H4 that merit 
schemes increase group wage inequalities among fathers was not supported.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Organizations are not simply sites in which wage inequalities are manifest; they play a 
critical role in their generation and reproduction. However, the limited availability of 
representative quantitative data linking individuals to the establishments in which they work 
has hindered scholars’ ability to conduct systematic empirical work on the organizational 
correlates of fatherhood wage premiums. Overcoming this limitation with rich linked data 
from Canada affords novel insights into the dynamics underlying fatherhood wage premiums. 
Much stronger support is revealed for Hodges and Budig’s (2010) argument that group 
differences in net fatherhood wage premiums reflect organizational hierarchies of hegemonic 
masculinities than evident in their individual-level data. This highlights the importance of 
specifying and testing arguments about organizations at the appropriate level. Of course, 
differential mobility across establishments may offset these intra-establishment hierarchies, 
with different underlying dynamics at play. Indeed (Cooke and Fuller, forthcoming) find that 
less-advantaged Canadian fathers garner a premium by sorting into high-wage firms, which 
somewhat counter-balances the average within-establishment advantage of more privileged 
fathers.    
Further, strong conclusions that the “gendering” of organizations reinforce hierarchies 
among men must be tempered with the recognition that organizational practices and 
structures condition group wage inequalities. Fatherhood premiums do not prevail in all 
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organizational contexts.  Formalization and, to a lesser degree, compensation practices 
matter. 
Consistent with research on gender, motherhood, and class-based wage gaps, 
collective bargaining agreements equalized. Such agreements create less room for discretion 
in wage setting, virtually eliminating the overall net fatherhood premium. The more equal 
wage distribution associated with collective bargaining also generally reduces group 
differences in premiums that favoured more advantaged fathers. The one exception to this 
was the emergence of significant hourly wage penalties for the least-educated unionized 
fathers.   
Similar to collective agreements, HR oversight reduced opportunities for bias to 
impact wages, but only that relating to family status rather than class. Unlike collective 
agreements, the presence of an HR department enlarged class inequalities more broadly by 
reducing premiums for the least-educated as well as non-professional fathers. That HR 
departments were associated with widening class inequalities in fatherhood premiums was a 
surprise. It may be that employers grant fathers higher wages because they equate need (and 
not just presumed performance) with deservingness. Since less advantaged fathers would 
“need” higher wages the most, their premiums would be most diminished with HR oversight. 
Although such valuative discrimination tends to map to existing hierarchies (with more 
advantaged groups seen as more deserving) (Castilla and Benard, 2010), results here suggest 
the need for more research exploring circumstances that lead to exceptions.  
Why wage premiums for the least educated fathers were not only diminished but 
actually reversed under collective agreements and HR Departments is a worthy topic for 
future research as well. The combination of rigid jobs and limited resources to purchase 
reliable childcare means the least-advantaged parents of both genders struggle to balance the 
demands of work and family life (Williams et al., 2013). Further, working class men who 
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visibly privilege care work over employment obligations can be subject to teasing and 
harassment, prompting them to “care in secret” rather than acknowledge family-related 
reasons for failing to fulfil work obligations (ibid). Perhaps formalized workplace systems are 
stricter in documenting and penalizing tardiness and unexpected absences resulting from 
challenges of fathering with limited resources (ibid). This serves as an important reminder 
that meeting both work and family obligations is not simply a problem for women – men are 
also affected when work is organized in ways that are difficult to reconcile with the rhythms 
of family life.   
An unanswered question from individual-level theories of the fatherhood premium is 
whether fathers really are more productive than childless men. Merit pay and incentive 
systems should more closely tie wages to performance, but merit pay actually reduced 
fatherhood premiums for all groups (and reversed them for the least educated). In contrast to 
Heywood and Parent’s (2017) findings, incentive pay had no effect on the size of fathers’ pay 
premium in the aggregate, although their data precluded controlling for establishment fixed 
effects as done here. One possible explanation for these differing results is therefore that 
fathers disproportionately select into higher-paying workplaces with incentive pay, a specific 
sorting possibility not tested by Cooke and Fuller (forthcoming). Nevertheless, incentive pay 
did have markedly mixed effects across sub-groups, increasing fatherhood premiums for 
married men and the most and least educated. In a context where norms about what 
constitutes a “good father” are shifting (Kaufman, 2014), these findings are intriguing. 
Differences in cultural values, overall financial constraints, and/or structural opportunities in 
the workplace may well combine to prompt non-uniform responses to pressures to maximize 
earnings versus time with family.  
Although merit pay theoretically ties wages more closely to productivity, it can 
magnify gender and racial wage gaps (Castilla, 2008; Castilla and Benard 2010). However, 
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merit pay reduced fatherhood premiums. It could be that fatherhood is not as salient a social 
category as gender or race, at least among white men. The “paradox of meritocracy” is 
theorized to occur because presumptions of meritocracy dampen pressures to examine 
prejudices (Castilla and Benard 2010). While awareness of gender and racial discrimination 
is widespread, public discourse has not similarly problematized fatherhood pay gaps. 
Whether a decision-maker gives reign to fatherhood biases may therefore be less sensitive to 
an understanding of the relative meritocracy of the organization.  
This study also diverges in an important way from Castilla (2008), and Castilla and 
Benard (2010). Their research designs compare merit awards for workers with similar 
performance evaluations. The results presented here do not hold presence or outcome of prior 
evaluation constant, and performance appraisals typically precede merit awards (Elvira and 
Graham, 2002). The prior equalizing impact of formalized appraisal may counter any 
subsequent valuative bias affecting the size of awards.
3
 Indeed, findings here are broadly 
consistent with Elvira and Graham (2002), who in contrast to Castilla (2008), do not assess 
merit-pay net of performance evaluation and find in the aggregate it equalizes pay differences 
between status groups.  
Although less studied than motherhood pay penalties, fatherhood premiums similarly 
structure broader gender wage inequalities. Yet just as scholarship on gender wage gaps 
reveals substantial differences by education, occupation, and across organizations, fatherhood 
premiums likewise vary. Even if within-establishment hierarchies tend to reinforce 
intersections of patriarchal advantage, formalized bureaucratic decision-making can counter 
the replication of gender-class wage inequalities associated with fatherhood. This suggests 
that shifting culturally-entrenched gendered divisions of household labour is not the only 
pathway to minimizing fathers’ economic advantage. Organizational changes can also bear 
fruit. Attending to the role of specific organizational characteristics, and not just household 
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dynamics or unitary conceptions of bureaucratic logics, is therefore an important avenue of 
investigation for scholars of family-related gender stratification.  
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NOTES 
1
 Authors’ review of provincial Human Rights codes.  
2
 Baseline model estimates are also extremely similar to those calculated with the 
conventional fixed effects estimator using the reduced sample and with the two-step 
procedure using only the reduced sample to estimate establishment fixed effects. 
3
 Models replacing merit pay with an indicator for formal performance appraisal resulted in 
very similar estimates.  
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Figure 1  Average within-workplace marginal effect of fatherhood on log hourly wages, by 
breadwinning, education, and occupation  
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Figure 2  Average within-establishment marginal effect of fatherhood on log hourly wages 
by workplace characteristics   
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Figure 3  Group differences in within-workplace marginal effect of fatherhood on log hourly 
wages by unionization and human resources departments  
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Figure 4  Group differences in average within-workplace marginal effect of fatherhood on  
log hourly wages by incentive and merit pay schemes 
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Appendix Table A-1   Net within-establishment fatherhood wage premiums (predicted                                     
effects) by group and establishment characteristics, white Canadian men   
                                     24-44   
Aggregate Fatherhood wage gap  
 
0.045*** 
   Fatherhood Wage Gap by Indicators of Hegemonic Masculinity  
 Education 
  Less than High School 
 
0.018*** 
High school 
 
0.056*** 
Postsecondary 
 
0.024*** 
University degree 
 
0.052*** 
Occupation 
 
 
Other Occupation 
 
0.035*** 
Manager or Professional Occupation 
 
0.067*** 
Breadwinner status (partnered men) 
 
 
Dual earner 
 
0.026*** 
Breadwinner 
 
0.061*** 
   Fatherhood Wage Gap by Establishment Characteristics  
 Formalization 
  Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) 
 
0.013*** 
No CBA 
 
0.058*** 
HR Department 
 
0.036*** 
No HR Department 
 
0.051*** 
Performance Pay Systems 
 
 
Merit Pay 
 
0.032*** 
No Merit Pay 
 
0.051*** 
Incentive Pay 
 
0.051*** 
No Incentive Pay 
 
0.046*** 
   Fatherhood Wage Gap by Establishment Characteristics and Hegemonic Masculinity 
Collective bargaining 
  University Degree CBA -0.005 
 
No CBA 0.069*** 
Less than High school CBA -0.020*** 
 
No CBA 0.031*** 
Manager or Professional  CBA -0.009 
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No CBA 0.084*** 
Other Occupation CBA 0.018*** 
 
No CBA 0.044*** 
Breadwinner CBA 0.010 
 
No CBA 0.076*** 
Dual earner CBA 0.013*** 
 
No CBA 0.031*** 
   HR Department 
  University Degree HR Dept 0.047*** 
 
No HR Dept 0.058*** 
Less than High school HR Dept -0.037*** 
 
No HR Dept 0.037*** 
Manager or Professional  HR Dept 0.060*** 
 
No HR Dept 0.073*** 
Other Occupation HR Dept 0.019*** 
 
No HR Dept 0.042*** 
Breadwinner HR Dept 0.018** 
 
No HR Dept 0.087*** 
Dual earner HR Dept 0.033*** 
 
No HR Dept 0.012*** 
   Merit Pay 
  University Degree Merit Pay 0.069*** 
 
No Merit Pay 0.048*** 
Less than High school Merit Pay -0.020* 
 
No Merit Pay 0.024*** 
Manager or Professional  Merit Pay 0.058*** 
 
No Merit Pay 0.075*** 
Other Occupation Merit Pay 0.011** 
 
No Merit Pay 0.041*** 
Breadwinner Merit Pay 0.011 
 
No Merit Pay 0.077*** 
Dual earner Merit Pay 0.016*** 
 
No Merit Pay 0.031*** 
   Incentive Pay 
  University Degree Incentive Pay 0.125*** 
 
No Incentive Pay 0.022*** 
Less than High school Incentive Pay 0.099*** 
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No Incentive Pay 0.009* 
Manager or Professional  Incentive Pay 0.078*** 
 
No Incentive Pay 0.066*** 
Other Occupation Incentive Pay 0.024*** 
 
No Incentive Pay 0.039*** 
Breadwinner Incentive Pay 0.100*** 
 
No Incentive Pay 0.054*** 
Dual earner Incentive Pay 0.058*** 
  No Incentive Pay 0.018*** 
*  p<.05,**   p<.01,*** p<.001 (two-tailed tests) 
   
Notes: Controlling for marital status, years of full-time experience, years of full-time experience 
squared, education, interactions between experience and education, tenure with employer, tenure 
squared, part-time and long work hours, occupation, and survey year. Effects of male 
breadwinning limited to sample of married and cohabiting men.  
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Appendix Table O-1     Descriptive statistics, white Canadian men 24 to 44  
 
Childless men Fathers 
 
Mean Mean 
< High school 0.10 0.12 
High school 0.51 0.52 
Postsecondary 0.18 0.19 
University 0.21 0.17 
Manager or Professional 0.31 0.33 
Other occupation 0.69 0.67 
Breadwinner 0.45 0.36 
Collective Bargaining Agreement 0.24 0.27 
HR Department 0.38 0.38 
Merit Pay 0.21 0.20 
Incentive Pay 0.22 0.20 
No spouse 0.52 0.10 
Married  0.25 0.71 
Cohabiting 0.23 0.19 
1-19 Employees 0.30 0.31 
20-99 Employees 0.35 0.32 
100-499 Employees 0.21 0.22 
500+ Employees 0.14 0.15 
Experience (years) 11.81 16.17 
 (6.62) (6.09) 
Seniority (years) 5.90 8.01 
 (5.57) (6.37) 
<35 hours week 0.09 0.03 
35-49 hours week 0.77 0.78 
50+ hours week 0.14 0.19 
Note: Standard deviations for continuous variables in parentheses.  
